In baseball, there are things that managers do without hesitation. When setting the lineup card, you want to have your best hitter bat third and your most powerful hitter hit cleanup. When you have a pitcher up with a runner on first with less than two outs, you have him sacrifice bunt. If there is a runner on first with two outs on a 3-2 count, you start the runner. All of these are things that every manager will do day in and day out. All are understandable and all things I agree with. There is, however, one thing I don’t agree with. For some reason, every manager will use the closer only in the ninth inning instead of using them in the highest leverage situation.
For clarification, using the closer in the highest leverage situation would mean, to me, after the sixth inning, if there is a more pivotal point in the game or if the opposition has its 3-4-5 due up in the lineup. Now, I’m not a saber guy. I think those who focus solely on that are ridiculous. I don’t want to pull out a calculator after each at bat or pitch to find stats that don’t even sound real (Xfip, seriously?). However, to disregard it completely is ignorant as well. People who live and die by sabermetrics are very big into pitching in leverage situations. Last night’s Pirates game was a perfect situation.
With Jason Grilli still on the shelf, Mark Melancon has done a superb job of holding down the closer’s role. In last night’s extra-inning loss to the Cardinals, the Pirates were ahead by one run heading into the eighth inning. Allen Craig, Matt Holliday and David Freese were due up for the Cardinals in the eighth. This, kids, is what we consider high leverage. The Cardinals have the meat of their order up in the eighth, trailing by one run. Instead of the Pirates using their closer and best pitcher in the bullpen, the Pirates opt to go with Bryan Morris.
Now, I have more faith in Morris than others do, but using him here instead of Melancon just doesn’t make sense. Morris ended up getting out of the inning, but not before making things very interesting.
What’s the reason Pirates Manager Clint Hurdle didn’t use Melancon in the eight? It’s simple, really. No manager will use their closer unless there is a save situation. It’s not the norm, so it won’t happen. But yet, the Pirates used a 21st Century defensive alignment (h/t Travis Sawchik) in the eighth inning to position Neil Walker perfectly for the last out. In the 11th, Hurdle brought in a fifth infielder for the casual 6-9-3 double play. If he will use these types of shifts that aren’t considered the norm, why won’t he take a chance with using his closer differently?
The averages for Craig, Holliday and Freese are .320/.293/.270 respectively. Had Melancon come in and retired the Cardinals in order, Jon Jay (.271), Tony Cruz (.219) and Pete Kozma (.228) were going to be due up. You’re telling me you’d prefer to have your closer, your best pitcher, face the weaker of the two trio’s? In high leverage situations, Melancon is holding the opposition to a .149 batting average.
It’s not a proven science (as a lot of saber guys want you to believe everything is), but there’s a very good chance it works. Even more than that, it just makes sense. A closer is the most overvalued and overrated player in the game. And a ninth inning mentality? Get out of here with that.
One day, a manager will take the chance and use this philosophy. Sure, they’ll catch flack when it backfires and get their head called for when it backfires on back-to-back occasions. Last time I checked, the way the closer’s role is currently constructed isn’t 100 percent flawless either.
